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Thomas Childers
National Socialism and the New Middle Class
In the recent literature devoted to the sociology of Weimar politics, a new consen¬
sus conceming the social bases of National Socialism appears to be emerging. Ac¬
cording to this view, the NSDAP did not simply represent a party of lower middle
class revolt or a movement of declasse mass man but a catch-all party of middle
class protest. Unlike the traditional bourgeois parties of the center and right, the
NSDAP succeeded in bridging the considerable cleavages which had long divided the
major elements of Germany's socially heterogeneous Mittelstand. By 1932 it had,
therefore, become a unique phenomenon in German electoral politics, a successful
party of bourgeois integration.
Yet, this National Socialist constituency was neither stable nor static. The social
composition of the Nazi electorate changed significantly between 1924 and 1932,
and support for the party varied in intensity, duration, and depth from one group
to another. Within some segments of the middle class the pattern of support was
clearly crisis related, surging in bad times, receding in good. In other groups, sup¬
port was both consistent and strong, reflecting more fundamental sociopolitical af-
finities. Because of the changing contours of the Nazi constituency, efforts to un¬
derstand the social dynamics of German fascism must focus on the shifting patterns
of middle class electoral sympathies, isolating trends within each of the Mittel¬
standes major components.
Of these patterns, perhaps none is more problematic or misunderstood than the re¬
lationship between National Socialist voting and the white collar employees and ci¬
vil servants of the "new middle class". White collar employees, though not neces-
sarily their civil service counterparts, are usually linked with the farmers, shopkee¬
pers, and self-employed artisans of the "old middle class*' as representatives of a
Kleinbürgertum traumatized by the disruptions of the post-war economy and hence
a prime source of recruitment for the radical right. The success of the NSDAP
among the marginal entrepreneurs of the old middle class has been documented by
See Linz, Juan J., Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological
Historical Perspective, in: Laqueur, Walter (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpre-
tations, Bibliography, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976, S. 3—121.
Childers, Thomas, The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote, in: Journal of Contempo¬
rary History, 11 (1976), S. 17-42.
The classical definition of "the new middle class'4 as a "Zwischenschicht" between the
entrepreneurial Mittelstand and the blue collar Proletariat was formulated by Emil Lederer in
two works: Die Privatangestellten in der modernen Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Tübingen 1912, and
his later collaborative analysis whith Jakob Marschak, Der neue Mittelstand, Grundriß der So¬
zialökonomik, Tübingen 1926.
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a variety of empirical methods. Indeed, these independent Mittelständler were to re-
main the hard core of National Socialist electoral support from 1924 through the
campaigns of 1932.4
The voting preferences of white collar employees, on the other hand, have been in-
ferred almost exclusively from the political orientation of the organized Angestell¬
tenverbände, which together represented only about one third of the white collar
labor force. Moreover, the resulting portrait of white collar political behavior tends
to be further distorted by the literature's concentration on the right wing Deutsch¬
nationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband (DHV), while the liberal and socialist unions,
which in 1931 still represented the majority of Germany's organized white collar
employees, have attracted very little scholarly attention.5
In contrast, civil servants have been almost totally ignored in the analysis of Weimar
voting. Relatively few studies of their organizations are available6, and most in¬
vestigations of the electoral preferences of the new middle class have treated civil
servants and white collar employees together, as if the two were socially identical.
Though this approach may have a certain Statistical Utility, the distinction between
Angestellte and Beamte must be drawn if important variations of socioelectoral be¬
havior are to be isolated and important clues in tracing the social foundations of
fascism are to be uncovered.
During the Weimar period, the new middle class made up approximately twenty per
cent of the German labor force. Of these salaried nonmanuals, forty-one per cent
were employed in the commercial and transportation sectors, twenty-seven per cent
in industry and handicrafts, and twenty-two per cent in administrative and profes-
See, for example, Winkler, Heinrich August, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialis¬
mus: Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Weimarer Republik, Co¬
logne 1971; Heberle, Rudolf, Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Un¬
tersuchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig Holstein 1918-1932, Stuttgart 1962;
and Childers, Social Bases.
The DHV has been the subject of a number of scholarly works. See, in particular, Hamel,
Iris, Völkischer Verband und Nationale Gewerkschaft, Hamburg 1967, andJones, Larry, E., Be¬
tween the Fronts: The German National Union of Commercial Employees from 1928 to 1933,
in: Journal of Modern History, 48 (1976). Also of interest are the memoirs of Krebs, Albert,
Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP. Erinnerungen an die Frühzeit der Partei, Stuttgart 1959.
Among the most useful studies of the civil service are Runge, Wolfgang, Politik und Beam¬
tentum im Parteienstaat. Die Demokratisierung der politischen Beamten in Preussen zwischen
1918 und 1933, Stuttgart, 1965; Morsey, Rudolf, Zur Beamtenpolitik des Deutschen Reichs
von Bismarck bis Brüning, and Fenske, Hans, Monarchisches Beamtentum und Demokratischer
Staat, both in Demokratie und Verwaltung, Schriftenreihe der Hochschule Speyer, Berlin, 50
(1972). Although focusing on a later period, Caplan, Jane, The Politics of Administration: The
Reich Interior Ministry and the German Civil Service 1933—1943, in: Historical Journal, 20
(1977), S. 707—736, as well as Mommsen, Hans, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart 1966,
provide important perspectives on the Weimar years.
See, in particular, Samuel A. Pratt's often cited The Social Bases of Nazism and Communism
in Urban Germany. A Correlation Study of the July 31, 1932, Reichstag Election in Germany,
M. A. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1948.
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sional Services. More than any other occupational groups, white collar employees
and civil servants were urban dwellers. Over two thirds of the middle class lived in
cities with over twenty thousand inhabitants, almost half in the large metropolitan
centers of over one hundred thousand residents.8
Of its two major components, white collar employees in the private sector were cer¬
tainly more numerous, comprising about sixty-one per cent of the economy's sala¬
ried nonmanuals. Measured by objective econotnic criteria, they were also harder
hit by the recurrent economic dislocations of the era. White collar salaries were low
and unemployment high, especially during the inflation and stabilization crises of
later 1923 and early 1924. In May 1924, for example, when National Socialist can¬
didates appeared on German ballots for the first time, the ratio of applicants to
available jobs in sales stood at fifteen to one, a ratio exceeded only by that of white
collar clerical employees.9 Moreover, as unemployment in other occupational cate¬
gories abated during the period of relative prosperity between 1924 and 1929, job-
lessness among white collar personnel persisted at disturbingly high levels. In bank¬
ing, the most prestigeous white collar sector, the stabilization of the mid-twenties
brought rationalization and the layoff of thousands. From a high of 320 000
employees in 1923, white collar positions in banking feil to 100 000 in 1928.10
With the onset of the depression, the Situation of the white collar population dete¬
riorated more rapidly. Between 1928 and 1932, salaries in banking and retail com¬
merce, by far the largest private employers of white collar labor, feil by approxima¬
tely twenty-six per cent. More serious, however, was the relentless rise of jobless-
ness among white collar personnel. In September 1928, 80 000 white collar
employees received unemployment compensation. Two years later the figure had
swollen to 261 000, and by December 1932, 522 000.n Ludwig Preller has estima¬
ted that whereas 2,4 % of all white collar employees were unemployed in 1927,
13,6% were jobless in 1932.12
Though certainly more insulated than their counterparts in the private sector, civil
servants also claimed to be victimized by the economic woes of the period. Most
traumatic were the austerity measures introduced by the Reich govemment in 1923
which resulted in a mass layoff of public officials. Forced into drastic budget slash-
ing by the exigencies of stabilization, the Reich dismissed 164 000 civil servants and
employees between November 1923 and April 1924, and State and local govern-
8
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Bd. 408, S. 173.
These economic data have been collected from the Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche
Reich 1924—1925, S. 289. For a contemporary analysis of the economic plight of the white
collar employee see Nothaas, Josef, Die Stellenlosigkeit der Angestellten, in: Allgemeines Sta¬
tistisches Archiv, 16 (1927), S. 290 f.
Dreyfuss, Carl, Beruf und Ideologie der Angestellten, Dissertation, Munich, 1933, translated
bv WPA and Department of Social Science, Columbia University New York 1938, S. 214.
Speier, Hans, Die Angestellten vor dem Nationalsozialismus. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis
der deutschen Sozialstruktur 1918-1933, Göttingen 1977, S. 72.
Preller, Ludwig, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Kronberg und Düsseldorf 1978,
S. 167.
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ments were compelled to take similar measures. It is estimated that nearly 750 000
public officials and civil employees lost their jobs. Since civil servants enjoyed
special legal privileges, among which was a position of permanent tenure, the emerg-
ency measures of 1923—24 were viewed by the Reiches civil service's associations as
a direct challenge to the unique legal and social Status of the German Beamtentum.
Job security, once a striking advantage of the public servant over his counterpart in
the private sector, was no longer a reality.13
Civil servants also complained of a decline in real income. In the months before the
May elections of 1924, the salary of a low ranking civil servant in a major urban
area was even lower than that of a retail clerk.1 Although civil servants of all ranks
suffered a decline in real income, the highest echelons were hardest hit. Officials in
the top five grades saw their real income shrink to between twenty-seven and thirty-
five per cent of their pre-war levels. This loss was considered even'more onerous
since, as one civil service commentator observed, "the highest officials were very
poorly paid even before the war.*' These civil servants were also less able to rely on
supplementary income from investments since many had placed their money in
govemment bonds with fixed rates of interest.
5
Lower level officials also experienced a contraction of real income, though to a les¬
ser extent. During 1923 real incomes in the lower ranks amounted to between forty-
three and eighty-two per cent of the pre-war Standards. Yet, many middle and
lower level civil servants were forced to augment their income with a second job.
Teachers, in particular, seem to have been hard hit by the inflation. Responding to
a survey on income and living conditions, a number of academics reported that they
were forced to work for day wages as manual laborers while others were compelled
to seil personal belongings to maintain the Standard of living to which they had be¬
come accustomed. At the German Natural Sciences Conference in 1922, one scholar
voiced his fear that due to the inflation, which at that time had not approached the
fantastic proportions of the following year, Germany's "cultured middle class" was
"about to disappear".16
Legislation enacted in 1927 at last brought some improvement in civil service sala¬
ries, but the deepening depression after 1928 again precipitated a crisis atmosphere
within the Beamtentum. Although civil servants continued to enjoy greater job se¬
curity than white collar employees, public officials were joltedby a series of emer-
gency measures which substantially reduced pensions and pay. Between December
1930 and February 1932, civil service salaries were slashed by approximately twen¬
ty per cent, and reduction of pensions and other benefits were staples of the Brü-
See Caplan, Jane, Politics of Administration, S. 708—711.
14
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1924-1925, XLIV, S. 286.
For an impassioned attack on this "levelling process" see Weber, Alfred, D:_ Not der Geisti¬
gen Arbeiter, München und Leipzig 1923, S. 16—25 und S. 41—51.
Schreiber, Georg, Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter, Leipzig
1923, S. 42.
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nmg recovery program Although never implemented, cutbacks in govemment per
sonnel, remimscent of the layoffs of 1923—24, were widely feared
17
In this increasingly bleak Situation, many educators and university administrators
were deeply concemed about the paucity of available positions for their graduates,
many of whom had discovered their expectations for a civil service career destroyed
by the economic dislocations of the post war period Even before the depression,
unemployment among professionals, particularly teachers, had reached exorbitant
levels By 1930 mountmg public concern was expressed about the "emergence of an
intellectual proletanat in the younger generation
"
Within just a few years, one
troubled observer warned, an "army of 120 000 unemployed academics" would
exist in Germany These jobless scholars would represent "battahons of agitators"
who, by "arousmg and whippmg up the masses", would "shake the Volk and the
State to their foundations"
18
Given these severe economic pressures, both white collar employees and, to a
somewhat lesser degree, civil servants appear to have been primed for radical pohti
cal behavior According to the traditional Interpretation, the steadily declining eco
nomic fortunes of the white collar population exacerbated an already advanced case
of Status anxiety and resulted in a gradual radicahzation of the Angestelltenschaft
Examination of the relative strengths of the white collar unions, the most frequent
ly cited evidence of this radicahzation, does, indeed, reveal that a nghtward gravi
tation of white collar sentiment had begun by at least 1925 In 1920, the Afa Bund,
a Free Trade Union associated with the SPD, accounted for almost forty eight per
cent of organized white collar labor, while the Christian nationahst Gedag, with its
major affiliat, the DHV, represented about thirty two per cent and the liberal GDA
twenty one per cent By 1931, however, the Gedag had surpassed the Afa to be
come the largest white collar union Though not formally affiliated with any po
litical party, the Gedag maintained close ties with the conservative DNVP until
1928 and thereafter its rank and file appears to have been successfully mfiltrated by
the National Socialists In 1930 one union associate estimated that half of the
DHV's members had voted Nazi in the Reichstag election of that year
2
To explam this apparent white collar attraction to National Socialism, historians
and sociologists have traditionally stressed the preoccupation of salaried employees
with the maintenance of their precanous middle class Status Lodged between the
entrepreneunal Mittelstand and the blue collar proletanat, white collar employees
See Mommsen, Hans, Die Stellung der Beamtenschaft in Reich, Landern und Gemeinden
m der Ära Brunmg, in Vierteljahrshefte zur Zeitgeschichte, 21 (1973), S 151 — 165
Achner, Leonhard, Der Arbeitsmarkt der geistigen Berufe in Allgemeines Statistisches Ar
chiv, 20 (1931), S 481-495
Figures for union membership are found in Kocka, Jürgen, Zur Problematik der deutschen
Angestellten 1914—1933, in Mommsen, Hans, Petzina, Dietmar, Weisbrod, Bernd (Hrsg)
Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Repubhk, Dusseldorf 1974, S
799
20
Jones, Larry E , Between the Fronts, S 473
23
are said to have experienced a mounting fear of social decline, of proletarianiza-
tion.21 Certainly the non-socialist white collar unions were insistent on preserving a
social and occupational position strictly segregated from blue collar labor. Both the
liberal and christian-nationalist unions endorsed the preservation of separate social
agencies for white collar employees. These organizations, such as the white collar
insurance and health administrations, perpetuated the gap between manual and
non-manual labor and were intended to do just that. Similarly, both unions shared
a corporatist view of the white collar role in society, each seeing the Angestellten¬
schaft as an "estate", a distinct social order with its own unique economic and Spi¬
ritual role in politics and society.22 Although the NSDAP maintained an ambivilant
attitude toward the future of unions, whether white or blue collar, its espousal of a
corporatist economy and the concomitant maintenance of a distinct white collar
Stand, is said to have been a major factor in attracting white collar support.23
Yet, in spite of the apparent vulnerability of the white collar/civil service popula¬
tion to the social and economic vicissitudes of the Weimar period, electoral support
for the NSDAP within the new middle class appears to have been far less extensive
than the traditional literature suggests. A regression analysis24 of voting in a sample
of one hundred and thirty-five geographically distributed, socially diverse, and pre-
dominately Protestant communities ranging in size from fifteen thousand to over a
million inhabitants reveals that the Nazi-new middle class relationship was surpri¬
singly tenuous, even after the onset of the depression. The weakness of this rela¬
tionship is particularly striking since the NSDAP found its most extensive and con¬
sistent support, especially after 1928, in precisely such Protestant areas.25 However,
21
Winkler, for example, states categorically that "the white collar workers were the group
which was most afraid of proletarianization". Similarly, Franz Neumann maintains that the
"salaried and professional employee did not want to 'be reduced to the level of the masses'. He
fought to retain his tenuous middle-class Status." See Winkler, Heinrich A., From Social Protec¬
tionism to National Socialism: The Small-Business Movement in Comparative Perspective, in:
Journal of Modern History, XLVIII (1976), S. 10, and Neumann, Franz, Behemoth. The Struc¬
ture and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944, New York 1944, S. 411.
22
See Fischer, Fritz W., Die Angestellten, ihre Bewegung und ihre Ideologie, Dissertation, Hei¬
delberg 1931, and Jobst, Rudolf, Die Deutsche Angestelltenbewegung in ihrer Stellung zu Kapi¬
talismus und Klassenkampf, Dissertation, Jena 1930, S. 72—76.
23
Kocka, Problematik, S. 807-808.
24
The figures in the tables below are partial regression coefficients. Such coefficients indicate
the amount of change to be expected in the dependent variable for every unit of change in the
independent variable when the effects of a third variable are statistically controlled. In Table I,
for example, the Nazi vote increased .225% for every one per cent increase in the number of
salaried non-manuals in a city, Controlling for the effects of the Catholic polulation. For an
introduction to regression analysis in electoral research see Tufte, Edward R., Data Analysis for
Politics and Policy, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1974, S. 65-77 und S. 134-148.
For the effects of religious affilitation on National Socialist voting see Burnham, Walter
Dean, Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: The United States and Weimar Ger¬
many, in: Journal of Interdiseiplinary History, 3 (1972), S. 1—30.
24
before 1930 the white collar/civil service variable proved to be a much stronger pre¬
dictor of both the liberal and conservative votes than of the Nazi. In the pre-depres-
sion era electoral sympathies within the new middle class appear to have been dis¬
tributed between the two traditional alternatives of bourgeois politics. After 1928,
however, the liberal figures dropped steadily, and the National Socialist coefficients
surged, peaking in 1930. Thereafter, the strength of the Nazi-new middle class rela¬
tionship slipped markedly, while the conservative coefficients exhibited a sustained
rise. Even in the critical election of July 1932, when the NSDAP received 37.3 % of
the vote, the new middle class remained more strongly related to the conservative
DNVP than to the National Socialists. (See Table 1).
Table I: New Middle Class and Party Vote in Predominately Protestant Communities (N=135)
1924a 1924b 1928 1930 1932a 1932b
NSDAP .154 .047+ .078 .225 .188 .154
DNVP .281 .481 .336 .193 .208 .294
LIB .212 .146 .286 .277 .066+ .099
(DDP + DVP)
The new middle class also lagged far behind other social variables as a predictor of
the Nazi vote. Both the self-employed of the old middle class and the Berufslose, an
amorphous census category of pensioners, investors, and others "without occupa¬
tion"
, proved to be much more strongly related to Nazi electoral Performance
than the white collar/civil service population, even after the calamities of the world
economic crisis descended on the Republic. (See Table 2)-
Table II: National Socialist Vote and Occupational/Social Group in Predominately Protestant
Communities (N=135)
1924a 1924b 1928 1930 1932a 1932b
Berufslose .496 .306 .154 .603 .800 .681
Seif employed .394 .046+ .365 .498 .672 .583
White Collar/
Civil Service .154 .047+ .078 .225 .188 .154
Blue Collar -.146 -.044+ -.076 -.231 -.291 -.205
Predominately Protestant Communities = those towns and cities with a Protestant population
exceeding sixty per cent of total inhabitants. In Tables I—IV, the figures are regression coeffi¬
cients, Controlling for %Catholic in the population. A + indicates that the coefficient is less than
two times the Standard error.
This group did not, however, inciude the unemployed.
25
Although some variations in this pattern emerge if the sample is divided into cate¬
gories of large, medium, and small communities (Groß-, Mittel- and Landstädte, to
use the census nomenclature), the Nazi-new middle class relationship is not direct¬
ly related to size of Community. In his correlation analysis of the July election of
1932, Samuel Pratt discovered that while the Nazi-white collar coefficients were
stronger in cities of between fifty and one hundred thousand inhabitants (Mittel¬
städte) than in the larger metropolitan centers (Großstädte), they sank once again
in the smaller communities of the sample (Landstädte).21 Moreover, while the Mit¬
telstädte demonstrated the highest coefficients, only eight per cent of Germany's
new middle class resided in such cities. Even if the largest cities are excluded from
the sample, the white collar/civil service variable still rates far below the old middle
class and Berufslose as a predictor of the National Socialist vote. (See Table 3).
Table III; National Socialist Vote and Occupational/Social Group in Predominately Protestant
Communities of less than 100 000 Inhabitants (N=112)
1924a 1924b 1928 1930 1932a 1932b
Berufslose .501 .311 .142+ .632 .867 .699
Seif employed .396 .288 .345 .500 .636 .532
White Collar/
Civil Service .199+ .119+ .102+ .312 .348 .254
The figures of Tables 1—3 strongly suggest that the depression simply did not bring
the sharp crystalization of support for National Socialism within the new middle
class so often assumed in the literature. Moreover, if the new middle class is further
divided into its two component groups, an equally surprising socioelectoral pattern
emerges. In the two key elections of the depression era, those of September 1930
and July 1932, the civil service variable proved to be a stronger predictor of the Na¬
tional Socialist vote than did its white collar counterpart in the Mittel- and Groß¬
städte where over half of the salaried population resided. While the white collar
coefficients rose steadily, peaking in the final election of 1932, the civil service
coefficients followed the curve of Nazi electoral fortunes, reaching their apex in Ju¬
ly 1932. (See Table 4)-
Although the figures of both salaried groups prove significantly weaker than those
of the old middle class and Berufslose, the surprisingly strong civil service coeffi¬
cients are particularly suggestive. Because of their well established position in the
State, civil servants, even in the middle and lower grades, enjoyed greater job securi¬
ty, often a higher level of education, and certainly greater social prestige than the
vast majority of their counterparts in the private sector. Indeed, this disparity in
27
Pratt, Social Bases, S. 78.
28
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 408, S. 173.
26
Table IVa: Party Vote and White Collar in Mittel- and Großstädten (N=80)
1930 1932a 1932b
NSDAP .244 .304 .733
DNVP -.342 -.338 .784
LIB (DDP + DVP) .277 .779 .335
Table IVb: Party Vote and Civil Service in Mittel- and Großstädten (N=80)
1930 1932a 1932b
NSDAP .488 .696 .387
DNVP .172 .153 .320
LIB (DDP + DVP) .102+ -.747 -.391
Status, both legal and social, was keenly feit by the white collar unions which strove
unceasmgly to have their members recognized as 'Privatbeamte1'.29 Despite efforts
of the Weimar govemment to "democratize" the Beamtentum, the civil service, as
Theodor Geiger pointed out in 1932, retained much of its former character as "a
social caste". Thus, while civil servants, especially of the middle and lower ranks,
appear to have possessed a varied social background,31 pressure for conversion to
the sociopolitical norms of Beamtentum was probably much greater than in white
collar positions According to Ralf Dahrendorf, civil servants, regardless of rank,
were much more hkely to identify with "the rulmg classes" than would private
employees
32
However, the special legal and social Status of the Beamtentum had been under mount¬
mg pressure smce the collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy, and the pohtical as well
as economic dislocations of the early republic had produced, in Peter Merkl's
words, "a whole crisis Stratum in the military and public service"
33
During the tur
bulent Brunmg years, civil service resentment over the challenge to its privileged po-
29
Kocka, Problematik, S. 792
30
Geiger, Theodor, Die soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes. Soziographischer Versuch
auf statistischer Grundlage, Stuttgart, 1932, S 98.
See Nothaas, Josef, Sozialer Auf und Abstieg im deutschen Volke, Kolner Vierteljahres
hefte für Soziologie, 9 (1930), S. 72-73.
Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industnal Society, Stanford, 1959, S. 51—57
According to Dahrendorf, this Identification with the established structure of State and society
renders civil servants less hkely to engage m radical political activity than white collar employees
33
Merkl, Peter H., Political Violence under the Swastika. 581 Early Nazis, Princeton 1975,
S.54.
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sition surged, spreading beyond the officials of the national administration to the
Land, Kreis and municipal levels as well. As the crisis deepened, the parties of the
anti-republican right, especially the NSDAP, were prepared to capitalize on the
growing malaise.
In Württemberg, for example, where curtailment of salaries and benefits was partic¬
ularly sharp, govemment officials were shocked at the "tone" of protesting civil ser¬
vants. It was disturbing, one State minister remarked after hearing the complaints of
university faculties, that "the professors have made their relationship to the State
dependent on a triviality such as the abolition of emeritus Status".34 Symptornatical-
ly, in the district around Trier, police reports noted that interest in National Sociaüst
rallies had become „very great not only among the small and middle businessmen
but also among many civil servants of the court, customs, finance, and railroad ad¬
ministration."
5
More ominously, however, investigators in Chemnitz discovered that an informal
"Association of National Socialist Police Officers" had been founded, and Reichs¬
wehr officers reported an increase of Nazi sympathizers in the ranks of the army.
6
During a single week in early 1932, the Brunswick NSDAP held six rallies specifi¬
cally for civil servants in municipal, State and Reich governments as well as for offi¬
cials in the postal and customs Services and employees of the State and private
banks.37
Nazi appeals to the civil service electorate were quite prominent in the party's cam-
paign literature both before and during the depression era. Between 1924 and 1932
National Socialist solicitation of the Beamtentum sounded two major themes. First,
the party appealed to the threatened elitist tradition of the Berufsbeamtentum,\&-
menting that its unique and elevated Status in the State and society had been deba-
sed by the "democratic excesses" of the Weimar system. Nazi electoral Propaganda
relentlessly pounded on the necessity of preserving the elitist Status of the Beamten¬
stand against the demeaning incursions of "Parteibuchbeamten". Specifically, the
party decried the Republic's policy of "democratization" of the civil service, which
allegedly resulted in the promotion of unqualified personnel through the patron¬
nage of the SPD and DDP. In their first electoral campaign of 1924, the Nazis loud-
34
Besson, Waldemar, Württemberg und die deutsche Staatskrise 1928-1933, Stuttgart 1959,
S. 241-250.
Heyen, Franz-Josef, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag. Quellen zur Geschichte des Nationalso¬
zialismus vornehmlich im Raum Mainz-Koblenz-Trier^Boppard am Rhein 1967, S. 67.
36
Orlow, Dietrich, The History of the Nazi Party 1919-1933, Pittsburgh 1969, S. 195.
37
Noakes, Jeremy, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933. London 1971, S. 173-174.
Rallies for particular occupational groups were Standard components of National Socialist Propa¬
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ly demanded the dismissal of all "revolution officials" and their replacement by
"trained professional civil servants". Preservation of a "professional civil service",
the Nazis reminded the Beamtentum, had been a plank in the original National So¬
cialist platform adopted in 1920.38
Second, National Socialist propaganda laid heavy stress on what it viewed to be the
unjust economic bürden which the civil service had been forced to bear in the post¬
war period. Weimar partisan politics, the Nazis charged, had blocked the career ad¬
vancement of qualified civil servants, while Weimar economic policy had steadily
eroded the public official's Standard of living. In both elections of 1924, for
example, the National Socialists maintained that civil servants had born the brunt
of the government's harsh stabilization program, a charge repeated with added vehe-
mence after the introduction of Brüning's austerity measures in 1930—31. The par¬
ty consistently bemoaned the "monstrous" decrees which reduced salaries and pen¬
sions and charged the Brüning govemment with the harassment of rightist officials.
When the regime instituted a two and one half per cent tax on civil service salaries
following the acceptance of the Young Plan, the Nazi press charged that "all civil
servants and employees of the Reich,'the State governments, the municipalities, the
Reichsbank, the Postal Service, and even members of the military" were being for¬
ced to pay Germany's unjust reparations. Not just high ranking officials, but "the
great mass of civil servants", Der Angriff maintained, "must pay the Young tribu-
te!"39
The long battle over the Young Plan also allowed the NSDAP to pose as an advoca-
te of greater freedom of political expression for civil servants. The Prussian law for-
bidding civil service membership in the NSDAP or KPD was condemned as "the la-
test abomination of the "system" and during the party's referendum against the
plan, the Nazis publicly charged the govemment with initiating "a campaign of .er¬
ror" against civil servants who supported the right wing campaign. Nazi officials
were being fired, the NSDAP contended, by a govemment infamous for its promo¬
tion of "Social Democratic and Democratic party members and notorious incom-
petents".40
National Socialist campaigns also stressed the shrinkage of job opportunities in the
civil service, allegedly the product of Social Democratic patronage and govemment
retrenchment. In 1924, the party calied for the revocation of the emergency ordi-
nances pertaining to personnel cutbacks and in subsequent campaigns refused to al-
low the SPD or the liberal parties to forget their participation in the governments
responsible for those measures.
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The two liberal parties, in particular, found themselves on the defensive. "Can one forget",
one DVP publication asked plaintively, "that at the close of last year (1923) the German Reich
stood before the imminent collapse of its finances and thus before hunger and turmoil? At that
29
While Nazi emphasis on these themes appears to have found substantial resonance
within the troubled Beamtentum, particularly in the critical elections of 1930 and
July 1932, the Nazi-white collar relationship was considerably weaker and more
problematic. Although the Nazi-white collar coefficients do follow a gradually as-
cending curve, the figures are surprisingly low. Even in December 1932, as the libe¬
ral coefficients continued to fade, the white collar variable was a stronger predic¬
tor of the conservative vote than of the National Socialist. Fear of social decline, of
Proletarisierung, was undoubtedly a powerful motivating force in the radicahzation
of some elements of the salaried population, particularly after the onset of the depres¬
sion. Indeed, Pratt found joblessness among white collar employees and National
Socialist voting to be strongly related.
2
In this regard, it is perhaps significant that
the Nazi-white collar figures reached their zenith in December 1932, the month in
which white collar unemployment peaked. Given the grim economic realities of
the depression, National SociaHst promise to reduce unemployment and, more
vaguely, to establish some form of corporatist social order may have been quite
alluring to white collar employees threatened byjoblessness orshrinking salaries.
However, while these aspects of the Nazi appeal may have attracted distressed white
collar employees, much of Nazi Propaganda was directed against institutions which
were quite central to the economic survival of the Angestelltenschaft. In order to
win the support of artisans and shopkeepers, the NSDAP ruthlessly condemned the
large department Stores where so many white collar employees worked as well as
the consumer cooperatives where many white collar employees purchased their
food and other necessities. In fact, National Socialist stress on the plight of small
business and the peasantry, its ambivilance, if not overt hostility, toward white col¬
lar unions, and its prominent solicitation of the working class vote were hardly cal¬
culated to attract white collar support.45
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Moreover, in a political culture where Status formalization, based largely on occupa¬
tion, was sharply pronounced, and campaign literature was, therefore, addressed
explicitely to Handwerker, Bauern, Beamten, etc., the paucity of such direct ap-
peals to Angestellte in Nazi electoral Propaganda suggests a basic ambivilance to¬
ward this very heterogeneous segment of the population. While artisans, shopkee¬
pers, peasants, pensioners, civil servants, and workers received prominent coverage
in Nazi campaign literature, white collar employees were usually treated more
generally as components of the "Arbeitnehmerschaft" or as "Arbeiter der Faust
und der Stirn". White collar employees feil between the well defined social fronts
of German politics, even in Nazi Propaganda.47
If the National Socialists were ambivalent about the Angestelltenschaft, that ambi¬
vilance appears to have been reciprocated by the white collar labor force. Although
white collar employees were over-represented in the party in 1930, their relative
share of the NSDAP's membership shrank during the three years before the Natio¬
nal Socialist Machtergreifung?* In part, this may be due to the troubled relation¬
ship between party and the DHV, which refused to support Hitler's presidential
candidacy in the spring of 1932, and the increasingly radical rhetoric of Nazi Propa¬
ganda, which to some white collar circles appeared "Marxist". While the Nazi link-
age of blue and white collar labor as "workers of the hand and the brain" was con¬
sistent with the party's evocations of a classless Volksgemeinschaft, the social level¬
ing implied in the concept certainly ran counter to the sociopolitical policies of the
non-socialist white collar organizations of the Weimar period.49 Moreover, in
evaluating white collar electoral support for the NSDAP, it is important to remem¬
ber that approximately thirty per cent of the salaried population was female. In
those districts where votes were tabulated by sex, women proved less likely to sup¬
port National Socialism than their male counterparts.50
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Without survey data, of course, any effort to establish motivational impulses behind
a Nazi vote must remain a matter of educated speculation. Declining economic
power and social prestige obviously drove some white collar employees and civil ser¬
vants to the National Socialist banner, as the traditional literature suggests. How¬
ever, it is significant that the data collected by Theodor Abel and re-interpreted by
Peter Merkl indicate that frustrated upward mobility was a very salient factor in
prompting a commitment to the NSDAP. Overfifty per cent of the urban upwardly
mobile Nazis in the Abel-Merkl sample were either civil servants or white collar
employees.51 Furthermore, Ronald Rogowskis recent study of the social origins of
the Nazi Gauleiter reveals that a large proportion of these leaders were not produets
of lower middle class backgrounds at all but rather upwardly mobile persons with
secure economic careers, many in the civil service.
More research on the motivational aspects of the Nazi vote is necessary and our
conclusions on that issue must remain tentative. However, given the extraordinary
social diversity within the new middle class, especially among the white collar wor¬
kers in the private sector,53 portraits of the salaried non-manual population as a
backward looking group obsessed with social Status and hence more readily ra-
dicalized than other elements of the German Mittelstand simply obscure a very
complex sociopolitical reality. Certainly distinctions between civil servants and
white collar employees should be drawn, and, ideally, distinctions of political and
social orientation within each of these heterogeneous groups as well. While the best
method for isolating important socioelectoral trends across a broad national sample,
the ecological Statistical techniques employed here do not permit an analysis of po¬
litical Variation within either group. More case studies of civil service and white
collar organizations, attitudes, and political activities are, therefore, desperately
needed.55
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What, then, do the figures presented above suggest and what are their implications
for an interpretation of fascism? Above all they indicate that the startling thrust of
National Socialism between 1928 and 1932 cannot simply be attributed to a
traumatized lower middle class of peasants, small shopkeepers, and white collar
employees threatened by proletarianization. Although low ranking civil servants
lived on virtually proletarian incomes, the Beamtentum, regardless of grade, en¬
joyed greater job security, usually a higher level of education, and greater social
standing than the Angestelltenschaft of the private sector. Support for the NSDAP
within the new middle class was therefore not only the product of sociopolitical
panic by a lower middle white collar electorate but an anti-systematic protest by an
injured, resentful, and traditionally conservative social elite as well.
Finally, unlike the Nazi-old middle class relationship, which remained strong and
consistent throughout the Weimar period, white collar and civil service support for
the NSDAP appears to have followed a rather clear pattern of protest voting, surg-
ing in periods of economic distress and subsiding upon the return of more "normal"
times. In periods of economic crisis, civil servants and white collar employees aug-
mented the nucleus of National Socialist supporters within the old middle class to
form a broadly based movement of middle class protest. While long standing dis-
content with the social and political evolution of post-war Germany rendered im¬
portant elements of the Mittelstand susceptible to the various appeals of National
Socialism, economic crises, in both 1923—24 and 1929—33, provided the necessary
catalyst for the socioelectoral dynamic of Nazi success at the polls. Thus, while the
NSDAP had, indeed, become a party of bourgeois integration, the coalition of so¬
cially heterogeneous forces which it had forged between 1928 and 1932 remained
tenuous, its cohesion dependent on the persistence of economic turmoil. The eco¬
nomic dislocations of the period affected the diverse elements of the Mittelstand in
different ways and support for the NSDAP varied from group to group. Only when
the shifting composition of this support is recognized can the examination of Na¬
tional Socialism move away from one dimensional class analysis and focus on the
complex set of social dynamics which lay at the root of fascism's success.
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